A Study of MAC Address Randomization in Mobile Devices and When it Fails

March 08, 2017 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

πŸ‘» CAUSE OF DEATH: Ghosted
No code link whatsoever

"No code URL or promise found in abstract"

Evidence collected by the PWNC Scanner

Authors Jeremy Martin, Travis Mayberry, Collin Donahue, Lucas Foppe, Lamont Brown, Chadwick Riggins, Erik C. Rye, Dane Brown arXiv ID 1703.02874 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Citations 246 Venue Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Last Checked 3 months ago
Abstract
MAC address randomization is a privacy technique whereby mobile devices rotate through random hardware addresses in order to prevent observers from singling out their traffic or physical location from other nearby devices. Adoption of this technology, however, has been sporadic and varied across device manufacturers. In this paper, we present the first wide-scale study of MAC address randomization in the wild, including a detailed breakdown of different randomization techniques by operating system, manufacturer, and model of device. We then identify multiple flaws in these implementations which can be exploited to defeat randomization as performed by existing devices. First, we show that devices commonly make improper use of randomization by sending wireless frames with the true, global address when they should be using a randomized address. We move on to extend the passive identification techniques of Vanhoef et al. to effectively defeat randomization in ~96% of Android phones. Finally, we show a method that can be used to track 100% of devices using randomization, regardless of manufacturer, by exploiting a previously unknown flaw in the way existing wireless chipsets handle low-level control frames.
Community shame:
Not yet rated
Community Contributions

Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!

πŸ“œ Similar Papers

In the same crypt β€” Cryptography & Security

Died the same way β€” πŸ‘» Ghosted