CUP: Comprehensive User-Space Protection for C/C++

April 17, 2017 · Declared Dead · 🏛 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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Authors Nathan Burow, Derrick McKee, Scott A. Carr, Mathias Payer arXiv ID 1704.05004 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Cross-listed cs.PL Citations 47 Venue ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Last Checked 3 months ago

Abstract

Memory corruption vulnerabilities in C/C++ applications enable attackers to execute code, change data, and leak information. Current memory sanitizers do no provide comprehensive coverage of a program's data. In particular, existing tools focus primarily on heap allocations with limited support for stack allocations and globals. Additionally, existing tools focus on the main executable with limited support for system libraries. Further, they suffer from both false positives and false negatives. We present Comprehensive User-Space Protection for C/C++, CUP, an LLVM sanitizer that provides complete spatial and probabilistic temporal memory safety for C/C++ program on 64-bit architectures (with a prototype implementation for x86_64). CUP uses a hybrid metadata scheme that supports all program data including globals, heap, or stack and maintains the ABI. Compared to existing approaches with the NIST Juliet test suite, CUP reduces false negatives by 10x (0.1%) compared to the state of the art LLVM sanitizers, and produces no false positives. CUP instruments all user-space code, including libc and other system libraries, removing them from the trusted code base.