Obfuscating the Interconnects: Low-Cost and Resilient Full-Chip Layout Camouflaging

November 14, 2017 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)

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Authors Satwik Patnaik, Mohammed Ashraf, Johann Knechtel, Ozgur Sinanoglu arXiv ID 1711.05284 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Citations 50 Venue 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD) Last Checked 5 months ago
Abstract
Layout camouflaging (LC) is a promising technique to protect chip design intellectual property (IP) from reverse engineers. Most prior art, however, cannot leverage the full potential of LC due to excessive overheads and/or their limited scope on an FEOL-centric and accordingly customized manufacturing process. If at all, most existing techniques can be reasonably applied only to selected parts of a chip---we argue that such "small-scale or custom camouflaging" will eventually be circumvented, irrespective of the underlying technique. In this work, we propose a novel LC scheme which is low-cost and generic---full-chip LC can finally be realized without any reservation. Our scheme is based on obfuscating the interconnects (BEOL); it can be readily applied to any design without modifications in the device layer (FEOL). Applied with split manufacturing in conjunction, our approach is the first in the literature to cope with both the FEOL fab and the end-user being untrustworthy. We implement and evaluate our primitives at the (DRC-clean) layout level; our scheme incurs significantly lower cost than most of the previous works. When comparing fully camouflaged to original layouts (i.e., for 100% LC), we observe on average power, performance, and area overheads of 12%, 30%, and 48%, respectively. Here we also show empirically that most existing LC techniques (as well as ours) can only provide proper resilience against powerful SAT attacks once at least 50% of the layout is camouflaged---only large-scale LC is practically secure. As indicated, our approach can deliver even 100% LC at acceptable cost. Finally, we also make our flow publicly available, enabling the community to protect their sensitive designs.
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