Combinatorial Bandits for Incentivizing Agents with Dynamic Preferences

July 06, 2018 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐Ÿ› Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence

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Authors Tanner Fiez, Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff arXiv ID 1807.02297 Category cs.LG: Machine Learning Cross-listed cs.AI, eess.SY, stat.ML Citations 3 Venue Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence Last Checked 3 months ago
Abstract
The design of personalized incentives or recommendations to improve user engagement is gaining prominence as digital platform providers continually emerge. We propose a multi-armed bandit framework for matching incentives to users, whose preferences are unknown a priori and evolving dynamically in time, in a resource constrained environment. We design an algorithm that combines ideas from three distinct domains: (i) a greedy matching paradigm, (ii) the upper confidence bound algorithm (UCB) for bandits, and (iii) mixing times from the theory of Markov chains. For this algorithm, we provide theoretical bounds on the regret and demonstrate its performance via both synthetic and realistic (matching supply and demand in a bike-sharing platform) examples.
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