Measuring the Impact of Spectre and Meltdown

July 23, 2018 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› IEEE Conference on High Performance Extreme Computing

πŸ‘» CAUSE OF DEATH: Ghosted
No code link whatsoever

"No code URL or promise found in abstract"

Evidence collected by the PWNC Scanner

Authors Andrew Prout, William Arcand, David Bestor, Bill Bergeron, Chansup Byun, Vijay Gadepally, Michael Houle, Matthew Hubbell, Michael Jones, Anna Klein, Peter Michaleas, Lauren Milechin, Julie Mullen, Antonio Rosa, Siddharth Samsi, Charles Yee, Albert Reuther, Jeremy Kepner arXiv ID 1807.08703 Category cs.DC: Distributed Computing Cross-listed cs.CR Citations 42 Venue IEEE Conference on High Performance Extreme Computing Last Checked 6 months ago
Abstract
The Spectre and Meltdown flaws in modern microprocessors represent a new class of attacks that have been difficult to mitigate. The mitigations that have been proposed have known performance impacts. The reported magnitude of these impacts varies depending on the industry sector and expected workload characteristics. In this paper, we measure the performance impact on several workloads relevant to HPC systems. We show that the impact can be significant on both synthetic and realistic workloads. We also show that the performance penalties are difficult to avoid even in dedicated systems where security is a lesser concern.
Community shame:
Not yet rated
Community Contributions

Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!

πŸ“œ Similar Papers

In the same crypt β€” Distributed Computing

Died the same way β€” πŸ‘» Ghosted