Stochastic Substitute Training: A Gray-box Approach to Craft Adversarial Examples Against Gradient Obfuscation Defenses

October 23, 2018 ยท Entered Twilight ยท ๐Ÿ› AISec@CCS

๐ŸŒ… TWILIGHT: Old Age
Predates the code-sharing era โ€” a pioneer of its time

"Last commit was 7.0 years ago (โ‰ฅ5 year threshold)"

Evidence collected by the PWNC Scanner

Repo contents: .gitattributes, 1_Random_Feature_Nullification.ipynb, 2_Thermometer_Encoding.ipynb, Effect_of_Noisy_Data_Augmentation.ipynb, README.md, attack.py, attack.pyc, aux_functions.py, aux_functions.pyc, cifar_model.py, cifar_model.pyc, discretization_utils.py, discretization_utils.pyc, models.py, models.pyc, trained_models

Authors Mohammad Hashemi, Greg Cusack, Eric Keller arXiv ID 1810.10031 Category cs.LG: Machine Learning Cross-listed cs.AI, cs.CR, stat.ML Citations 9 Venue AISec@CCS Repository https://github.com/S-Mohammad-Hashemi/SST โญ 2 Last Checked 1 month ago
Abstract
It has been shown that adversaries can craft example inputs to neural networks which are similar to legitimate inputs but have been created to purposely cause the neural network to misclassify the input. These adversarial examples are crafted, for example, by calculating gradients of a carefully defined loss function with respect to the input. As a countermeasure, some researchers have tried to design robust models by blocking or obfuscating gradients, even in white-box settings. Another line of research proposes introducing a separate detector to attempt to detect adversarial examples. This approach also makes use of gradient obfuscation techniques, for example, to prevent the adversary from trying to fool the detector. In this paper, we introduce stochastic substitute training, a gray-box approach that can craft adversarial examples for defenses which obfuscate gradients. For those defenses that have tried to make models more robust, with our technique, an adversary can craft adversarial examples with no knowledge of the defense. For defenses that attempt to detect the adversarial examples, with our technique, an adversary only needs very limited information about the defense to craft adversarial examples. We demonstrate our technique by applying it against two defenses which make models more robust and two defenses which detect adversarial examples.
Community shame:
Not yet rated
Community Contributions

Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!

๐Ÿ“œ Similar Papers

In the same crypt โ€” Machine Learning