The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games
January 22, 2019 Β· Declared Dead Β· π International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
"No code URL or promise found in abstract"
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Authors
Rui Cao, Pavel Naumov
arXiv ID
1901.08467
Category
cs.AI: Artificial Intelligence
Cross-listed
cs.GT,
cs.LO,
math.LO
Citations
1
Venue
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Last Checked
3 months ago
Abstract
A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper adopts this approach and proposes a modal logical system for reasoning about the degree of blameworthiness. The main technical result is a completeness theorem for the proposed system.
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