The Android Platform Security Model (2023)

April 11, 2019 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security

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Authors RenΓ© Mayrhofer, Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Chad Brubaker, Dianne Hackborn, Bram BonnΓ©, GΓΌliz Seray Tuncay, Roger Piqueras Jover, Michael A. Specter arXiv ID 1904.05572 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Cross-listed cs.OS Citations 93 Venue ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
Android is the most widely deployed end-user focused operating system. With its growing set of use cases encompassing communication, navigation, media consumption, entertainment, finance, health, and access to sensors, actuators, cameras, or microphones, its underlying security model needs to address a host of practical threats in a wide variety of scenarios while being useful to non-security experts. To support this flexibility, Android's security model must strike a difficult balance between security, privacy, and usability for end users; provide assurances for app developers; and maintain system performance under tight hardware constraints. This paper aims to both document the assumed threat model and discuss its implications, with a focus on the ecosystem context in which Android exists. We analyze how different security measures in past and current Android implementations work together to mitigate these threats, and, where there are special cases in applying the security model in practice; we discuss these deliberate deviations and examine their impact.
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