Schemes for Privacy Data Destruction in a NAND Flash Memory

December 28, 2019 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› IEEE Access

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Authors Na-Young Ahn, Dong Hoon Lee arXiv ID 2001.00522 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Cross-listed eess.SP, eess.SY Citations 43 Venue IEEE Access Last Checked 6 months ago
Abstract
We propose schemes for efficiently destroying privacy data in a NAND flash memory. Generally, even if privcy data is discarded from NAND flash memories, there is a high probability that the data will remain in an invalid block. This is a management problem that arises from the specificity of a program operation and an erase operation of NAND flash memories. When updating pages or performing a garbage collection, there is a problem that valid data remains in at least one unmapped memory block. Is it possible to apply the obligation to delete privacy data from existing NAND flash memory? This paper is the answer to this question. We propose a partial overwriting scheme, a SLC programming scheme, and a deletion duty pulse application scheme for invalid pages to effectively solve privacy data destruction issues due to the remaining data. Such privacy data destruction schemes basically utilize at least one state in which data can be written to the programmed cells based on a multi-level cell program operation. Our privacy data destruction schemes have advantages in terms of block management as compared with conventional erase schemes, and are very economical in terms of time and cost. The proposed privacy data destruction schemes can be easily applied to many storage devices and data centers using NAND flash memories.
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