A New Doctrine for Hardware Security
July 18, 2020 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐ ASHES@CCS
"No code URL or promise found in abstract"
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Authors
Adam Hastings, Simha Sethumadhavan
arXiv ID
2007.09537
Category
cs.CR: Cryptography & Security
Cross-listed
cs.AR
Citations
13
Venue
ASHES@CCS
Last Checked
3 months ago
Abstract
In this paper, we promote the idea that recent woes in hardware security are not because of a lack of technical solutions but rather because market forces and incentives prevent those with the ability to fix problems from doing so. At the root of the problem is the fact that hardware security comes at a cost; Present issues in hardware security can be seen as the result of the players in the game of hardware security finding ways of avoiding paying this cost. We formulate this idea into a doctrine of security, namely the Doctrine of Shared Burdens. Three cases studies---Rowhammer, Spectre, and Meltdown---are interpreted though the lens of this doctrine. Our doctrine illuminates why these problems and exist and what can be done about them.
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