Dissecting BFT Consensus: In Trusted Components we Trust!

February 03, 2022 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› European Conference on Computer Systems

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Authors Suyash Gupta, Sajjad Rahnama, Shubham Pandey, Natacha Crooks, Mohammad Sadoghi arXiv ID 2202.01354 Category cs.DB: Databases Cross-listed cs.CR, cs.DC Citations 39 Venue European Conference on Computer Systems Last Checked 3 months ago
Abstract
The growing interest in reliable multi-party applications has fostered widespread adoption of Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols. Existing BFT protocols need f more replicas than Paxos-style protocols to prevent equivocation attacks. Trust-BFT protocols instead seek to minimize this cost by making use of trusted components at replicas. This paper makes two contributions. First, we analyze the design of existing Trust-BFT protocols and uncover three fundamental limitations that preclude most practical deployments. Some of these limitations are fundamental, while others are linked to the state of trusted components today. Second, we introduce a novel suite of consensus protocols, FlexiTrust, that attempts to sidestep these issues. We show that our FlexiTrust protocols achieve up to 185% more throughput than their Trust-BFT counterparts.
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