On the Privacy Risk of In-context Learning

November 15, 2024 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐Ÿ› arXiv.org

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Authors Haonan Duan, Adam Dziedzic, Mohammad Yaghini, Nicolas Papernot, Franziska Boenisch arXiv ID 2411.10512 Category cs.LG: Machine Learning Cross-listed cs.CR Citations 57 Venue arXiv.org Last Checked 5 months ago
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are excellent few-shot learners. They can perform a wide variety of tasks purely based on natural language prompts provided to them. These prompts contain data of a specific downstream task -- often the private dataset of a party, e.g., a company that wants to leverage the LLM for their purposes. We show that deploying prompted models presents a significant privacy risk for the data used within the prompt by instantiating a highly effective membership inference attack. We also observe that the privacy risk of prompted models exceeds fine-tuned models at the same utility levels. After identifying the model's sensitivity to their prompts -- in the form of a significantly higher prediction confidence on the prompted data -- as a cause for the increased risk, we propose ensembling as a mitigation strategy. By aggregating over multiple different versions of a prompted model, membership inference risk can be decreased.
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