LymphNode: A Plug-and-Play Access Control Method for Deep Neural Networks

May 15, 2026 ยท Grace Period ยท + Add venue

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Authors Hanyu Pei, Shang Liu, Zeyan Liu arXiv ID 2605.16227 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Citations 0
Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are high-value intellectual property (IP), yet deploying them to edge environments exposes them to \textbf{unrestricted oracle access}, rendering them vulnerable to model extraction and inversion attacks. Existing defenses fail to address this practically: passive watermarking only offers post-hoc provenance, while active defenses impose prohibitive latency or require persistent access to sensitive training data. To bridge this gap, we propose \textit{LymphNode}, a novel post-hoc defense framework that acts as an intrinsic ``immune system" within the model. \textit{LymphNode} enforces a strict ``default-deny'' policy: it actively neutralizes model utility for unauthorized queries via \textbf{Generalized Sparse Universal Adversarial Perturbations (GSUAP)} injected into the feature space, effectively blocking gradient estimation and data inference. Utility is selectively restored only for authorized inputs carrying a stealthy feature-domain credential. Our framework is highly practical: it is \textbf{data-efficient}, establishing robust protection with fewer than 100 samples ($<1\%$ of training data), and \textbf{cross-dataset adaptable}, enabling protection using public surrogate datasets. \textit{LymphNode} thus provides a lightweight, immediately deployable defense for high-stakes scenarios where original training data is restricted or unavailable.
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