Module Lattice Security (Part III): Structured CVP Distance on the Log-Unit Lattice

May 17, 2026 Β· Grace Period Β· + Add venue

⏳ Grace Period
This paper is less than 90 days old. We give authors time to release their code before passing judgment.
Authors Ming-Xing Luo arXiv ID 2605.17404 Category cs.DS: Data Structures & Algorithms Cross-listed cs.CR, math.NT, math.ST, quant-ph Citations 0
Abstract
We prove that the $L^2$ CVP distance from a random short ring element to the log-unit lattice of $\Q(ΞΆ_{2^k})$ converges to $\fracΟ€{2\sqrt{6}}\sqrt{n}$ as $n=2^{k-1}\to\infty$. We then show that this target lies inside the Voronoi cell of the origin for $k\ge 4$. For the $L^\infty$ norm, the maximum over $n$ sub-Gaussian coordinates yields $O(\sqrt{\log n})$ which translates into a sub-polynomial approximation factor for the Short Generator Problem. We show a Coarse Lattice Theorem that Babai's algorithm returns zero for all structured targets, yet exactly recovers unit perturbations of arbitrary size. For module determinant ideals, we further prove the Trigamma Theorem that proves an intrinsic imbalance $Οƒ_{g_0}=O(1)$ independent of the modulus $q$. Finally, combined with Parts I and II, we reduce the CDPR factor for ML-KEM from $\exp(\tO(\sqrt{n}))$ to a sub-polynomial value.
Community shame:
Not yet rated
Community Contributions

Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!

πŸ“œ Similar Papers

In the same crypt β€” Data Structures & Algorithms