How Agentic AI Coding Assistants Become the Attacker's Shell

May 25, 2026 ยท Grace Period ยท + Add venue

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Authors Yue Liu, Yanjie Zhao, Yunbo Lyu, Ting Zhang, Haoyu Wang, David Lo arXiv ID 2605.25871 Category cs.SE: Software Engineering Cross-listed cs.CR Citations 0
Abstract
Agentic AI coding assistants can edit files, run commands, and access the internet on behalf of developers. However, their reliance on unvetted external artifacts introduces a new attack vector. Hidden instructions in external artifacts can hijack these assistants, turning them into an attacker's shell to run unauthorized commands. In this article, we examine how these prompt injection attacks work, measure their prevalence, discuss the limitations and challenges of current defenses, and suggest future research directions.
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