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How Agentic AI Coding Assistants Become the Attacker's Shell
May 25, 2026 ยท Grace Period ยท + Add venue
Authors
Yue Liu, Yanjie Zhao, Yunbo Lyu, Ting Zhang, Haoyu Wang, David Lo
arXiv ID
2605.25871
Category
cs.SE: Software Engineering
Cross-listed
cs.CR
Citations
0
Abstract
Agentic AI coding assistants can edit files, run commands, and access the internet on behalf of developers. However, their reliance on unvetted external artifacts introduces a new attack vector. Hidden instructions in external artifacts can hijack these assistants, turning them into an attacker's shell to run unauthorized commands. In this article, we examine how these prompt injection attacks work, measure their prevalence, discuss the limitations and challenges of current defenses, and suggest future research directions.
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