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Snatcher: Apple Find My Network Exposes Your Lost Devices To Strangers
June 19, 2026 ยท Grace Period ยท ๐ the Proceedings of the 2026 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Authors
Zhenyu Ren, Yanbo Zhang, Boya Liu, Mo Li
arXiv ID
2606.21067
Category
cs.CR: Cryptography & Security
Citations
0
Venue
the Proceedings of the 2026 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Abstract
Apple's Find My network connects nearly one billion devices to locate missing property via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). This paper reveals that insecure BLE advertisements and design tradeoffs allow unauthorized discovery and physical theft of lost Apple devices. We develop Snatcher, an attack and analysis framework implemented fully on Android smartphones without specialized hardware. Snatcher identifies vulnerabilities in unencrypted BLE advertisements, unauthenticated acoustic triggers, and slow MAC address randomization. Through three levels - sound-based direction finding, RSSI-IMU sensor-fusion navigation, and spatial-temporal clustering - our Android-based platform physically tracks and locates lost Apple accessories and devices in real-world tests. Our results highlight a crucial conflict between privacy protection, anti-stalking design, and physical security, urging Apple to strengthen Find My defenses.
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