Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences

July 31, 2023 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› European Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Authors Jiehua Chen, Christian Hatschka, Sofia Simola arXiv ID 2307.16864 Category cs.MA: Multiagent Systems Cross-listed cs.DS, cs.GT Citations 3 Venue European Conference on Artificial Intelligence Last Checked 3 months ago
Abstract
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for single-crossing approval preferences, winner determination of the Monroe rule is polynomial, and for both rules, winner determination mostly admits FPT algorithms with respect to the number of voters to delete to obtain single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. Our results answer some complexity questions from the literature [18, 28, 21].
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