Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness

April 06, 2020 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Workshop on Internet and Network Economics

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Authors Haris Aziz arXiv ID 2004.02554 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.DS Citations 43 Venue Workshop on Internet and Network Economics Last Checked 6 months ago
Abstract
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ex-ante envy-free lottery over envy-free up to one item (EF1) deterministic allocations. It has the following advantages over a recently proposed algorithm: it does not rely on the linear programming machinery including separation oracles; it is SD-efficient (both ex-ante and ex-post); and the ex-ante outcome is equivalent to the outcome returned by the well-known probabilistic serial rule. As a result, we answer a question raised by Freeman, Shah, and Vaish (2020) whether the outcome of the probabilistic serial rule can be implemented by ex-post EF1 allocations. In the light of a couple of impossibility results that we prove, our algorithm can be viewed as satisfying a maximal set of properties. Under binary utilities, our algorithm is also ex-ante group-strategyproof and ex-ante Pareto optimal. Finally, we also show that checking whether a given random allocation can be implemented by a lottery over EF1 and Pareto optimal allocations is NP-hard.
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