Impact of Temporary Fork on the Evolution of Mining Pools in Blockchain Networks: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

November 14, 2020 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering

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Authors Canhui Chen, Xu Chen, Jiangshan Yu, Weigang Wu, Di Wu arXiv ID 2011.07238 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.NI Citations 37 Venue IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Last Checked 6 months ago
Abstract
Temporary fork is a fundamental phenomenon in many blockchains with proof of work, and the analysis of temporary fork has recently drawn great attention. Different from existing efforts that focus on the blockchain system factors such as block size, network propagation delay or block generation speed, in this paper we explore a new key dimension of computing power from the miners' perspective. Specifically, we first propose a detailed mathematical model to characterize the impact of computing power competition of the mining pools on the temporary fork. We also derive closed-form formula of the probability of temporary fork and the expected mining reward of a mining pool. To reveal the long-term trends on the computing power distributions over the competing mining pools, we then develop an evolutionary game framework based on the temporary fork modeling and accordingly characterize the set of stable evolution equilibriums. Both extensive numerical simulations and realistic blockchain data based evaluation provide evidence to support our theoretical models and discoveries.
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