Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

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Authors Tim Roughgarden arXiv ID 2012.00854 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.DC, cs.DS, econ.TH Citations 140 Venue arXiv.org Last Checked 1 month ago
Abstract
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs.
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