Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559
December 01, 2020 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐ arXiv.org
"No code URL or promise found in abstract"
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Authors
Tim Roughgarden
arXiv ID
2012.00854
Category
cs.GT: Game Theory
Cross-listed
cs.DC,
cs.DS,
econ.TH
Citations
140
Venue
arXiv.org
Last Checked
1 month ago
Abstract
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs.
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