To EVM or Not to EVM: Blockchain Compatibility and Network Effects

We study the competition between blockchains in a \emph{multi-chain} environment, where a dominant EVM-compatible blockchain (e.g., Ethereum) co-exists with an alternative EVM-compatible (e.g., Avalanche) and an EVM-incompatible (e.g., Algorand) blockchain. While EVM compatibility allows existing Ethereum users and developers to migrate more easily over to the alternative layer-1, EVM incompatibility might allow the firms to build more loyal and ``sticky'' user base, and in turn a more robust ecosystem. As such, the choice to be EVM-compatible is not merely a technological decision, but also an important strategic decision. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model to study this competitive dynamic, and find that at equilibrium, new entrants/developers tend to adopt the dominant blockchain. To avoid adoption failure, the alternative blockchains have to either (1) directly subsidize the new entrant firms or (2) offer better features, which in practice can take form in lower transaction costs, faster finality, or larger network effects. We find that it is easier for EVM-compatible blockchains to attract users through direct subsidy, while it is more efficient for EVM-incompatible blockchains to attract users through offering better features/products.